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IN EVENT OF CONFLICT, WHICH
HOLDS PRIORITY?
RENzo D. BoWERs
GENERAL FEATURES OF SPECIAL ASSESSMENTS
A special assessment is a charge laid against specific real property,
pursuant to legislative direction, for the-payment of which the owner is
compensated by a resulting benefit in improvement of the property
charged, commensurate, in theory at least, with the amount of the
assessment. The authority to levy and thus to charge is lodged in the
state and is traceable to its taxing power; and this sovereignty, subject
to constitutional dictation, as a convenient channel for the accomplish-
ment of its purposes, delegates to municipal bodies the right, and may
place on them the duty, to install the improvements and to settle against
the benefited property a charge for such proportion of the cost as the
property may be shown to have gained by reason of the improvements.
This authority must be exercised in accordance with the procedure
devised in the instrument of delegation. This is but to say that the
agent must follow instructions. It is frequently remarked in the
authorities that statutory requirements in this regard must be strictly
pursued. And while this pronouncement has been generally subscribed
to, it will be found that courts, whether or not they have thereby legis-
lated, have in many instances gone far afield in supplying by intendment
deficiencies resulting from legislative dereliction and in upholding the
proceedings of municipalities which, in some particulars,, were not in
fact sanctioned by previous act of the state.
It has sometimes been asserted that in the making of public improve-
ments and levying assessments therefor a municipal body is the agent
of the property owner. But this can hardly be so. Such owner has
no voice in directing the performance of the work, he cannot order it
either to proceed or to cease, and he can exercise no control over the
municipality; nor can the municipality in every instance bind the
property owner in the same degree as if it were his agent. All the
owner can do is to insist that the grant of power be not exceeded and
that the procedure outlined by the state be not flagrantly departed from.
His duty is to pay the involuntary charge in much the same way that
he pays his other taxes.
It is because the proceedings for public improvements are usually
invita Minerva that the municipality is held to a strict pursuit of its
delegated authority. If the property owner be the movant, much is
forgiven if the letter of the law be not strictly observed, for the princi-
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ples of waiver or estoppel may operate against him to the extent that'
he ought not in good faith be heard to complain of irregular procedure
which, by apparent solicitation, he may have invited.
In thinking of the effect to be given a lien allowed for the cost of
public improvements, there necessarily arises a consideration of the
purposes to be served. In some quarters it is deemed sufficient to say
that the power to levy assessments for such improvements is a deriva-
tive of the inherent power of the state to tax, and that a special assess-
ment is a species of taxation. Still, the assessment should not be
elevated to the plane of a tax laid for general governmental exigencies,
for under the latter private property may in effect be confiscated if
public necessity therefor should arise, and the extent of the former is
measured by. the benefit which specific property receives from the
expenditure by means of which it is improved. It is not true,
however, that the benefit to the property is the sole basis of the state's
power to cause a lien to be fixed on the property for its own improve-
ment. If that were so, the effect would be that the state could compel a
property owner to install improvements for his own benefit, whether he
would or not. There is a third element that is part and parcel of the
source of the state's power in this regard. This element is the benefit
of the municipality itself, which is but to say that the improvement is
for the public good, inclusive of the good of every inhabitant within it.
Streets are improved for the public good. Sewers are laid for the
public good; and drains are installed because public benefit is thereby
accomplished. That specific property receives a greater benefit than
that accruing to the public in general, is but an incident to the public
improvement. Yet, incidental as it is, the fact of this special benefit
must exist in order to render valid the assessments for which a lien is
given against the specific property for its proportion of the cost of the
improvement.
It is no longer questioned that such liens may be validly imposed.
But question is still frequently made as to the extent to which they may
be allowed to operate when other liens and encumbrances covering the
same property have intervened. If the assessments could be held on a
parity with general taxes, no such question could arise. A general tax,
originating in the paramount necessity that the government shall have
the means to support itself, is an obligation of the citizen superior to all
other demands that may be made against him. And the obligation
being of this high order, it has been considered from the very beginning
of all systems of taxation that the sovereign must possess the requisite
power to enforce payment promptly and without fail. As a means to
this necessary end, taxes levied against real estate have been held
ex propria vigore a lien on the property with priority over all other liens,
without express legislative declaration thereof, and without regard to
the time or manner in which such other liens may have originated. For
these reasons, a mortgage or deed of trust against real property must
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be subordinated to the demands of general taxes whether or not they
are prior in point of time, and whether or not there is a statute giving
such priority.
Other questions enter into a consideration of the relative priority
of the lien of a special assessment and that of a mortgage against the
same property. What if the matter of priority is regulated by the
express terms of the statute? What may be implied from the wording
of the statute? What if the statute is wholly silent as to the priority?
Of what force is the fact that the mortgage may have been executed and
recorded before the statute was enacted? All of these questions have
been considered by the courts in settling conflicts that have arisen
between the lien of a mortgage and that for a special assessment for
public improvements.
PRIORITY OF ASSESSMENT LIEN UNDER EXPRESS PROVISION OF STATUTE
The text-writers agree that it is within the province of the legislature
to enact that the lien for special assessments shall take precedence over
a mortgage lien.
"A lien for public taxes and assessments is upon the property, and is
paramount to all liens acquired by personal contract, when so provided
by statute. . . Although the lien of a prior recorded mortgage is
superior to that of a special assessment, it is within the power of the
legislature to change the rule, and make the mortgage lien secondary to
that of the assessments.'
"Not only is it competent for the state to charge land with a lien for
the taxes imposed thereupon, but the legislature may, if it deem it
proper or necessary to do so, make the lien a first claim on the property,
with precedence of all other claims and liens whatsoever, whether
created by judgment, mortgage, execution, or otherwise, and whether
arising before or after the execution of the tax. When that is done the
lien does not stand on the same footing with an ordinary encumbrance,
but attaches itself to the res without regard to individual ownership, and
if enforced by sale of the land the purchaser will take a valid and unim-
peachable title."
2
The courts uphold this conclusion of the text-writers, basing their
approval of such legislative power largely on the necessity for com-
munity advancement through public improvements. This is well
explained by the California court thus :3
"Whether the power to tax for street improvements is to be referred
to the general taxing power and the power of eminent domain, or, as
some courts have suggested, to the police power, is not very important.
Whatever its source may be, it exists beyond question by reason of its
nature and objects, and that it partakes of the nature of the taxing
power must be admitted. The power to levy a tax for general purposes,
'Hamilton, Special Assessments (1907) sec. 7o8.
2 2-Cooley, Taxation (3d ed. 19o3) pp. 866-868.
'German Sa4ngs, etc. Soc. v. Ransh (19o2) 138 Calif. 12o, 124, 69 Pac. 89, 92.
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which shall be a lien superior to all other liens, prior or otherwise, is not
doubted, and it is not because it is called a tax, but because of its object
and the necessity for raising revenue in order to execute the functions
of government. In modern times, wbatever may have been the demands
of society in an earlier period of the development of government, the
necessity for improving the streets of cities and towns, while perhaps
less important in degree than the general objects of government, is yet
important and necessary to the welfare of the whole community, and
-the principles on which the system of general taxation depends, and
which govern in the enforcement of tax levies for general purposes, are
also applicable to taxation for the improvement of streets, the con-
struction of sewers, and other like public work."
In addition to the element of public interest that enters into a con-
sideration of the question of legislative power to declare the lien of
special assessments superior to other liens, courts have thought of the
benefit to the property itself in determining what ought to be the rule.
It is said that the public improvement enhances the value of the private
property to tie extent that the cost is laid against it. The mortgage
lien being on the entire interest of the owner, the increase in value by
reason of the improvement enures to the advantage of the mortgagee by
adding to the amount of his security. And since the addition is made
without expense to the mortgagee, his lien should be postponed to the
claims of the one who has made the improvement.
This argument runs quite generally through the authorities whether
there is a statute regulating priority, whether the statute is silent as to
priority, or whether a deduction is sought to be made from the implica-
tions of a statute. But it must be confessed that the argument is
considerably refined and somewhat strained. It is true that in theory
the benefit to the property must equal the cost of the improvement with
which it is charged. In practice this is frequently a chimera. And
especially is there often gross disproportion between the benefit and the
charge where the expense for the improvement of an entire district is
put in hodge-podge and each owner required to pay the proportion of
the whole cost that the frontage of his property bears to the frontage
of the district. If it be a fact that the benefit does equal the cost, this
benefit is added to the equity of the owner and thus may be made to
respond to the claims of the assessment-lien holder. The amount of the
benefit is not added to the mortgage. The mortgagee holds no greater
claim against the mortgagor than he held prior to the improvement.
The improvement is made without his consent. Perhaps it was not
even contemplated at the time his mortgage originated. Yet to protect
his security he may be called on to discharge a debt for the creation of
which he was not responsible, and for which he receives nothing.
In such cases, the mortgagee gets slight comfort from the courts.
He is usually dismissed as he was in a New Jersey case with the blunt
statement that4 "it is well settled that, in the exercise of its sovereign
'Doremus v. Cameron (i891) 49 N. 3. Eq. I, at p. 7, 22 AtI. 802, at p. 8o4.
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power of taxation, the state may displace prior encumbrances, although
the displacement may be prejudicial to individual right." That pro-
nouncement was at least frank. There was no pretense that through
the reversing of his priority the mortgagee was left as well off as he was
before. The decision was on the theory of paramount necessity.
It is not incumbent on courts to advance these refined considerations.
The inherent nature of special assessments, the need of public improve-
ments for community advancement, the knowledge imputed to one
contemplating the acceptance of a mortgage that such improvements
may be ordered in, are sufficient to make his lien secondary.
Whatever the arguments or reasoning of the courts, it is universally
held that it is within the legislative prerogative to enact that a mort-
gage lien, whether anterior or subsequent in point of time to that of the
special assessment, shall be subordinated in effect to the latter.5
PRIORITY IMPLIED FROM OTHER STATUTORY PROVISIONS
As previously suggested in this article, the courts have in many
instances reached out and supplied by intendment many deficiencies in
proceedings relating to public improvements for which the legislature
could have provided but did not. It is not my purpose to consider here
the question of how far the courts should go in this regard; it is suffi-
cient to state what they have actually done.
The cyclopaedic statement of the rule to be followed in construing
such statutes as to lien priority has not apparently met with judicial
approval. "Taxes and assessments levied upon land which is already
subject to a mortgage do not displace or outrank the lien of the mort-
gage in the absence of an express legislative declaration that they shall
constitute a paramount lien." 6  This doctrine has been subscribed to
by one court,7 which held that in order to give the lien of a special
assessment .priority over existing encumbrances there must be words in
the statute expressing such legislative intent.
Text-writers approach the subject cautiously. Thus, by one it is
said :" "In the absence of a statute giving an assessment priority over an
earlier mortgage lien, an assessment has no such priority." The
'Bauvian v. Ross (1897) 167 U3. S. 548, 17 Sup. Ct. 966; Provident Ist. v.
Jersey City (1885) 113 U. S. 5o6, 5 Sup. Ct 612; Weinreich v. Hensley (1898)
121 Calif. 647, 54 Pac. 254; State v. Kilburn (19o8) 81 Conn. 9, 69 At. 1028;
People v. Weber (1896) 164 Ill. 412, 45 N. E. 723; O'Brient v. Bradley (19O1) 28
Ind. App. 487, 61 N. E. 942; Des Moines Brick Mfg. Co. v. Sinith (1899) io8
Iowa, 307, 79 N. W. 77; Dressman v. Simonin (1898) lO4 Ky. 693, 47 S. W. 767;
Gorneringer v. McAbee (1917) 129 Md. 557, 99 Atl. 787; Swith v. St. Paul
(1911) 116 Minn. 44, 133 N. W. 74; Keating v. Craig (1881) 73 Mo. 507; Shaler
v. McAleese (19o7) 73 N. J. Eq. 536, 68 Atl. 416; Pittsburg's Appeal (1871)
7o Pa. 142; Krutz v. Gardiner (19Ol) 25 Wash. 396, 65 Pac. 771.
e27 Cyc. 1176.
'Moody v. Sewerage Board (Tgo6) 117 La. 360, 41 So. 649.
g2 Page and Jones, Taxation by Assessment (19o9) sec. lo68.
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authors, it will be noticed, do not say that the statute must expressly
declare such priority. In another treatise on the subject there is an
apparent contradiction in consecutive sentences :9 "It is, for these
reasons, often proper to deduce from the general language of the statute
giving a lien the conclusion that it gives a paramount lien to which mort-
gage estates or judgment liens must yield. But this conclusion cannot,
perhaps, be inferred where no provision is made for giving those who
hold such interests a hearing, and where there are no words declaring
the superiority of the lien." Of course, if there are words declaring
the superiority of the assessment lien, it is not necessary to look further.
But suppose there are no such words?
The courts, in nearly all cases where the question has been raised, have
not been ambiguous in expressing their views. They adhere to the rule
that the statute must itself determine the character and extent of a lien
given for public improvements. But they say that it is not necessary
that the state should in express terms declare that the lien shall be a
paramount one. If the intent can be gathered from the general provi-
sions and purposes of the law, the courts will enforce it.
"We can readily perceive that there are cases in which the adjudica-
tion in favor of the priority of a mortgage lien would seriously inter-
fere with the prosecution of a work for the promotion of the public
welfare, but the creation of liens and their incidents is a legislative
matter, and the courts cannot create such liens.
The statute must determine the character and extent of the lien. It
is not necessary that it should in express terms declare that the lien
shall be a paramount one, for if the intention can be gathered from the
general words and purposes of the statute, the courts will give it
effect."10
The Kentucky court has gone as far in implying the priority of an
assessment lien over that of a mortgage as any adjudication that has
come under the writer's notice. The charter of a city merely gave the
municipality power to cause the improvements to be made, allowed a
lien for their cost with authority to direct a sale of the property
improved in accordance with by-laws and regulations to be adopted by
the city. There was a clash between the assessment lien and that of a
prior mortgage.
"Whilst this language [the above charter provisions] does not
expressly say that such liens shall be prior in rank to other liens on said
property, it seems to us that it does this by necessary implication. This
power the city can exercise against the owner of the property, and
certainly a mortgagee can have no higher equity or claim in the property
than the mortgagor gave him. His interest and title in same are condi-
tional and less than that of the mortgagor, and his rights in the property
are entitled to no greater consideration than those under whom he
claims. He, with the owner, has profited by the enhanced value given
02 Elliott, Roads and Streets (3d ed. 1911) sec. 749.
"State v. Aetna Life Ins. Co. (1888) 117 Ind. 251, 252, 20 N. E. 144.
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the property by the improvements which the assessment is made to pay
for....
We are of the opinion that the lien provided for in the section of the
charter quoted, supra, existed from the date when such charter became
operative against all the real property within the limits of the city. It
was simply a suspended power which the council could enforce when-
ever, in their discretion, the public interests required it, and all persons
dealing in such real property were bound to take notice.""
Perhaps the real reason of the court's conclusion is found in these
words immediately following the above statements:
"Any other construction gives to the landholder the power to so
encumber his land as to render nugatory the power vested in the
common council for the benefit of the whole community to improve
streets at the expense of the abutting property holders."
To this reasoning it might be answered that, since there is no common
law of assessments, there should be an expression of the legislature as
to priority, or language should be used which would disclose an intent
of the lawmakers that such assessment lien should be superior to others,
that in the charter in question no language was used in any way
showing such intent, and that therefore the implication was an arbitrary
one.
The authorities are practically unanimous, however, in holding that,
in the absence of express statutory declaration of priority in favor of
the assessment lien, such priority will be implied if the general language
in the act will permit.
12
This rule is undoubtedly the correct one. The proceeding by which
the cost of the improvement is allowed to be charged against the land
to the extent of benefits is in rem in its nature. It is the whole interest
in the land that is charged, not merely a part of it, or some particular
interest in it. The improvement is for the benefit of every interest in
the land, for the lien-holder as well as the owner, from which arises
the necessity that the lien allowed for the improvement expenses must
be coextensive with the estate benefited.
While the implication of priority should be a reasonable one and have
some relevancy to the context of the statute, .the construction of such
laws is ordinarily not a difficult matter. Where the statute provided
that, "any person interested in any property assessed may file objec-
tions," and after sale the title was "subject to redemption by the
former owner or his grantee, mortgagee, etc.. . .," it was clear that the
legislature meant to subordinate the mortgage lien to that of the
' Dressan v. National Bank (1897) 100 Ky. 571, 576-577, 38 S. W. 1052, 1054.
1Lybass v. Ft. Myers (19o8) 56 Fla. 817, 47 So. 346; Wabash E. Ry. v. East
Lake, etc. Drainage District (i89o) 134 IIl. 384, 25 N. E. 781; Morey-v. Duluth
(1899) 75 Minn. 221, 77 N. W. 829; Richmond v. Williams (19o4) 102 Va. 733,
47 S. E. 844; Carstens v. Seattle (1915) 84 Wash. 88, 146 Pac. 381; Ann. Cas.
1917A io79, note.
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assessment.13 And the same inference was irresistible where, in addi-
tion to a right of redemption given a mortgagee, it was enacted that his
rights should not be divested until after six months' written notice to
him of a sale under the assessment. 14 The same was true under a
provision that all "persons interested" and the "owner" might appear
and oppose the confirmation of the assessments and the entry of judg-
ment therefor, and the further direction that if they failed to do so
they were concluded thereby.' 5 This construction was likewise adopted
under a statutory provision that the "owner or any other person having
an interest in the property charged with the tax bill" might pay the sum
due in a given time. 6 The provision that the assessment should be
collected as other taxes were was also held a sufficient basis for an
implied priority of the assessment lien.' And even where the statute
merely directed that the municipal charge should remain, a lien until
fully paid, it was said that this would warrant the same implication.:'
But in another case it was held that no such implication would arise
from the provision that the charge should be a lien "from the time of
filing the petition."'1
WHERE STATUTE IS SILENT AS TO PRIORITY
The above discussion has practically covered a consideration of those
instances where the state has given a lien for improvement assessments
but has failed to lay down any express rule regulating priority. It has
been seen that the courts are insistent in giving such a lien priority over
that of a mortgage. In fact, it would appear that the mortgage lien
would be held superior only under an express provision of the law
subordinating the assessment.
There have been instances where it has been held that if the statute
is silent as to priority, an assessment lien will be secondary to that of an
existing mortgage.20  Such effect was given to the mortgage lien in the
case cited, on the ground that there was nothing in the statute from
which priority of the assessment could be implied. The court agreed,
however, that it was not necessary that the law should expressly declare
the assessment lien a paramount one; such could be implied from other
provisions of the statute. But another court found, in a statute which
was entirely silent as to priority, an intent of the legislature to favor
the assessment over the mortgage.
2 '
3 Carstens v. Seattle, sitpra note 12; O'Brien v. Bradley, supra note 5.
14Howell v. Essex County Road Board (i88o) 32 N. J. Eq. 672.
13Morey v. Duluth, supra note 12.
"Morey Enginwering Co. v. St. Louis Ice Rink Co. (1912) 242 MO. 241, 146
S. W. 1142.
"TSeattle v. Hill (1896) 14 Wash. 487, 45 Pac. 17; 35 L. R. A. 372, note.
Germania Savings Bank v. Miller (19oo) 48 PIrTsB. L. J. 6.
Killian v. Andrews (1892) 13o Ind. 579, 3o N. E. 7oo.
"State v. Aetiu Life Ins. Co., supra note io.
' Lanian v. Waltenspiel (9,5) 45 Utah, 564, 147 Pac. 9o8.
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The case of Carstens v. Seattle, already cited as an instance of uphold-
ing the priority of the assessment by implication from other provisions
of the statute, comes very near on its reasoning to a support of priority
even though the statute be silent as to such priority. The reasoning
of the court was as follows :2
"In addition to the remedy by sale of the land as above noticed, the
city may enforce the lien of the assessment by an ordinary civil action
of foreclosure in court. The statute contains no express provision in
terms making the assessment lien superior to prior mortgages or other
prior private liens. This procedure, we are of the opinion, points to a
legislative intent to charge the assessment against the land itself regard-
less of its ownership and regardless of all prior liens upon its owner-
ship which rest upon private contract, or which of necessity are only a
charge upon some person's title or interest in the land. Such private
liens, of course, can rise no higher than their source. For, manifestly,
no person can by contract create a lien'upon land superior to his own
title or interest therein, while the sovereign power of taxation can
create a lien superior to every private interest in the land."
MORTGAGE GIVEN BEFORE THE ENACTMENT OF THE
IMPROVEMENT STATUTE
Where a state, either by the express provisions of its legislative enact-
ments or by implications to be clearly drawn therefrom, attempts to
give priority in favor of a special assessment lien over an existing
mortgage, constitutional considerations arise as to the power to make
such law retroactive. And it is a question to be resolved according to
the constitution of the particular state by which the law was enacted.
The United States Constitution contains no expression as to the power
of a state in regard to retrospective legislation. The Supreme Court
has gone far enough to say that it was not prepared to hold it violative
of the Federal Constitution for a state to enact that a local improvement
lien should have precedence over other existing encumbrances."3
In some states there is an express constitutional prohibition against
the passage of retroactive laws. Under such a provision, it has been
held that the legislature cannot give preference to an assessment lien
to the detriment of an existing mortgage.2 4 In Illinois, on the other
hand, the court announced the doctrine that such a law does not impair
the obligation of contracts nor interfere with vested rights. In so
holding, the court said :25
"It is urged that the Drainage Law, so far as it attempts to give a lien
for assessments superior to the liens of existing encumbrances, is uncon-
stitutional because it violates the obligation of contracts or divests vested
rights. This clearly cannot be so. Every property-owner holds his
Carstens v. Seattle, supra note 12.
Provident Inst. v. Jersey City, supra note 5.
" Mellinger v. Houston (1887) 68 Tex. 37, 3 S. W. 249.
" Wabash E. Ry. v. East Lake Drainage District, supra note x2.
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property subject to the exercise of the taxing power, and it is imma-
terial, so far as this question is concerned, what may be the nature of
his interest, whether the fee, an estate in expectancy, an estate for years
or a mere lien. This is true, as every one must admit, in relation to
general taxes, where the only return to the tax-payer is the protection
and security which the government gives him, and a fortiori should it
be true in case of special assessments where, in theory at least, he
receives an adetuate and complete return for the money assessed in the
enhanced value of the estate or property which he owns or to which
his lien attaches." The Indiana court has held similarly.28
The intention of the legislature to make the law retroactive, and
thereby to supplant an existing private lien with a statutory one, should
be plain. There is a presumption against anything but a future effect
from the enactment. Especially is this true of taxes or assessments
that are to be collected for future use.27
It is apparent, in considering the decisions of the courts that have
been called on to determine the relative priority of special assessment
and mortgage liens, that they have arrived at singularly uniform results
in view of the widely separated roads which they have traveled. There
is noticeable strain in some of the reasoning advanced to sustain the
desired conclusion. But this is found true in nearly all decisions which
in any way involve a discussion of the law governing assessments for
public improvements. This will remain true until courts abandon all
inclination to assign the power to levy the assessments to any other
branch of the sovereignty than the power to tax. The assessment is a
tax. Why say it approximates a tax? The theory of benefits is a
convenient one to lean on, but it is largely a hoax. Especially is this
true where authority is given to lay the entire cost of the improvements
against the abutting property.
Whatever be the reasoning, however, it is sure that the mortgagee-
the ancient forecloser-has himself been foreclosed by the legislatures
and the courts. There is very little comfort for him when he locks
horns with a special assessment lien. He seldom has cause to hope for
anything better than second-money.
'Baldin v. Moronwy (igio) 173 Ind. 574, 91 N. E. 3, under Acts, 18gi, ch.
196, a statute enacted after the decision of State v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., supra
note io.
"Pittsburg's Appeal (1861) 4o Pa. 455.
